



11 




HOUSE OF 


ON THE.IUDIOIARV 

REPRESENTATIVES 


SIXTIETH CONGRESS 


11. R. 18()47 

AND STATEMENT 


JOHN J. JENKINS, Wisconsin, Chairman 
RICHARD WAYNE PARKER, New Jersey 
DE ALVA S. ALEXANDER, New York 
CHARLES E. LITTLEFIELD, Maine 
CHARLES Q. TIRRELL, Massachusetts 
JOHN A. STERLING, Illinois 
JOHN H. FOSTER, Indiana ^ 

HENRY T. BANNON, Ohio 
REUBEN O. MOON, Pennsylvania 


GERRIT J. DIEKEMA, MICHIGAN 
GEORGE R. MALBY, New York 
HENRY S. CAULFIELD, Missouri 
DAVID A. De ARMOND, Missouri 
HENRY D. CLAYTON, Alabama 
ROBERT L. HENRY, TEXAS 
WILLIAM G. BRANTLEY, Georgia 
CHARLES C. REID, Arkansas 
EDWIN Y. WEBB, North Carolina 


Printed by order of the Committee 


WAS^HINGTUN 

(U)vkrn:\iknt printing office 



19 08 







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A B1LI> To amend first subdivision of section six hundred and twenty-nine of the 
Revised Statutes of the United States. 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and .House of Representatives of the United 
States oj America in Congress assembled ^ That the first subdivision of 
section six hundred and twenty-nine of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States is hereby amended so as to read as follows: 

‘‘Sec. 629. The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction as 
follows: 

“First. Of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, 
where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or 
value of five hundred dollars, and an alien is a party, or the suit is 
between a citizen of the State where it is brought and a citizen of 
another State, or of the District of Columbia, or of a Territory of the 
United States: Provided, That no circuit court shall have cognizance 
of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other 
chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been 
prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment 
had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange.'’ 

To the Comrriittee on the Judiciary: 

In support of the petition we have presented in behalf of our 
fellow-citizens of the District of Columbia seeking equal rights with 
the citizens of the several States before the circuit courts of the 
United States, we respectfully submit the following statenlent for 
your consideration. 

Under the provisions of the judiciary act, approved September 24, 
1789, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States was 
extended to “controversies between citizens of different States.” 
(Sec. 629, U. S. Rev. Stats.) 

The first case in which the status of the citizens of the District of 
Columbia was made the jurisdictional question was that of Hepburn 
V. Ellzey (2 Cr., 452-3) argued in the Supreme Court in 1804, when 
Alexandria was within the limits of the District of Columbia, and it 
was held by the court, construing that clause of the judiciary act, 
that a citizen of the District of Columbia was not a citizen of a State, 
so as to give him standing as a suitor in the United States courts. 

In the case of Barney v. Baltimore (6 Wall., 280), wherein parti¬ 
tion of land in Maryland was sought in 1867, it appeared that three 
out of four complainants seeking this relief before the circuit court 
of that District were citizens of the District of Columbia. The court, 
upon the question of jurisdiction being raised, held that citizens of 
the District of Columbia, not being citizens of a State within the 
provisions of the judiciary act, could not sue and that the objection 
was well made and the bill was dismissed. 

In the year 1897, the question was again raised in the case of 
Hooe V. Jamieson (166 U. S., 395), and the court again held that 
where it appeared that a party to a suit in the United States circuit 
court was a citizen of the District of Columbia the court was without 
jurisdiction to hear the case, and so the parties were out of court. 

3 


4 


H. K. 13(347 AND STATEMENT. 


More frequently in these days is this question of the rights of citi¬ 
zens of the District of Columbia to the protection of their interests 
before the courts of the United States submitted to counsel—in 
very important cases, wherein the facts in each case, the residence 
of the several parties, and the many local considerations surround¬ 
ing particular cases are such, as make it important to the litigants 
on either side to secure the decisions of their rights under the laws 
of the United States, in the courts of the United States, through to 
the court of last resort. In such cases it works great hardship to 
the suitor to be held down to the jurisdiction of State courts to 
which under the decisions of the Supreme Court they are now 
restricted. 

The injustice of this discrimination against the citizens of the 
District of Columbia is so self-evident, that your petitioners believe 
that your honorable committee will readily agree that a prompt 
remedy should be applied. 

If this be conceded, the only (question to be determined is as to 
the steps to be followed to correct the injustice. So far-reaching is 
the effect of the construction of the law as it stands, that no matter 
what may be the interests involved, if one of the parties necessary to 
a determination of the rights involved appears on the record to be 
a citizen of the District of Columbia, the courts of the United States 
are barred to all. The general importance of these common rights 
demand correction of the evil, even should an amendment of the 
Constitution be required to effect it. 

But we do not think this tedious method is necessary. 

We respectfully sidunit that in reason and in the decided cases will 
be found conclusive arguments to sustain our ])osition, that by the 
legislative action of the Congress itself, amending section 629 of the 
Revised Statutes of the ITnited States, a complete remed}’ can be 
supplied, extending the judical power of the United States circuit 
courts to Controversies between citizens of the District of Columbia 
and the citizens of any State. 

We preface our argument in support of this by reference to the 
preamble to the Constitution, wherein the people declared tliat one 
of the principal purposes of that instrument was ‘Uo establish justice’’ 
for ‘Snirselves and our posterity.” 

And Article IV, section 2 provides that ‘Alie citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several states.” 

At that time tlie citizens, of what is now the District of Columbia 
were citizens of Maryland. 

In McCulloch V. St. of Maryland (4 Wh., 403), Marshall, C. J., de¬ 
clared that the Constitution obtained its authority from the peo])le; 
that the Government proceeds directly from the people and in the 
name of the yieople, and that its powers are to be exercised directlv 
on them and for their benefits. 

He declares that the laws of the United States, when made in pur¬ 
suance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land ‘‘any¬ 
thing in the Constitution or the laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.” He proceeds to construe and define the meaning 
of the language of the final clause of section 8, Article I of the Con¬ 
stitution, and lays down the rule that the powers of Congress under 


H. R. 13647 AND STATEMENT. 




the Constitution extend to whatever is ‘dieedful and adapted’’ to the 
particular occasion. 

Since the powers of the Government are principally to be exer¬ 
cised for the benefit of the people, for all of the people of the United 
States, conditions and needs of that portion of the citizens of the 
United States found within the District of Columbia are to-day so 
great, so extensive, and so important (in respect of the relief we spe¬ 
cially seek to-day) as to make the legislation asked for most needful 
and specially adapted to secure for us equal justice before the judi¬ 
cial tribunals of the United States. 

We have, however, the highest authority for this proposition. 

In the earliest case in which this jurisdictional question came up 
for consideration in the Supreme Court of the United States (Hep¬ 
burn V. Ellzey, 2 Cr., 452-3), which was argued in the February term 
1804, that court by Marshall, C. J., after arguments which went 
thoroughly into the question, said: 

It is true that as citizens of the United States and of that particular District which 
is subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, it is extraordinary that the courts of the 
United States, which are open to aliens and to the citizens of every State in the Union, 
should be closed upon them. But this is a subject for legislative, not for judicial 
consideration. 

That court, in the case of Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheaton 317, 
remarks that ‘df the general language of the Constitution should be 
confined to the States, still the sixteenth paragraph of section 8, 
Article I, gives to Congress the power of exercising exclusive legisla¬ 
tion in all cases whatsoever within this District.” 

Congress, in the first section of the act approved July 8, 1846, 
under which the portion of the District formerly within the county 
of Alexandria was retroceded to the wState of Virginia, recites the 
power it had under the Constitution therein to ^^mll and absolute 
right and jurisdiction as well of soil as of persons residing or to reside 
therein.” 

If then in the exercise of its exclusive right under the Constitution 
Congress is to legislate ^dn all cases whatsoever” in respect of the 
soil, this power is declared to include also the right to legislate in all 
cases whatsoever as to the persons residing therein. 

Congress having evidenc?d its right to give back by legislation to 
a portion of the residents of the District the full rights of citizenship, 
we may logically find the right in Congress to give unto the remain¬ 
ing citizens the single right of suing in the United States courts for 
the protection of their legal rights. 

The argument in favor of the retrocession to Virginia is stated in 
the preamble to the act of July 8, 1846, to rest upon the belief by 
Congress that they did not require that part of the territor}" for the 
purposes of the seat of the Government. 

,As shown above, it was not deemed that the jurisdiction given to 
suits between citizens of different States was of any importance at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The citizens of the 
District of Columbia are by the Constitution given over for the pro¬ 
tection of their rights to the exclusive control of Congress ‘dn all 
cases whatsoever.” And it is clearly for Congress alone to consider 
what is needful for the protection of our rights and by legislation to 
supply it. 


H. K. 13(47 AND STATEMENT'. 




In the case of Ijougliborough v. Blake (supra) it was contended 
that under, section S, Article I, of the Constitution, no clirect tax 
could be imposed upon residents of the District of Columbia, because 
that section related to the States of the Union; yet the court held 
that although the language of the second section of Article 1 required 
that the direct tax should be extended to all the States, the right of 
exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever within the District gave 
to Congress the power to impose such direct tax, the requirements 
of the Government in respect of its revenues clearly leading to the 
court’s conclusions. 

If in that case the language of the Constitution could be made to 
extend beyond what its strict letter, which applied only to States as 
such, would seem to mean, the right of Congress to legislate for the 
correction of a most unjust discrimination against the large body of 
the citizens of the United States resident in this District should be 
conceded. 

The language of Chief Justice Marshall in Hepburn v. Ellzey, within 
two years after the District became formally the seat of government, 
shows that the court assumed that when necessity required it Congress 
would legislate to correct the extraordinary conditions, even then 
recognized. 

In U. S. V. Reese (92 U. S., 213) the Supreme Court says: 

Rights and imniimities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the 
United States c-an be protected by Congress. The form and the manner of the protec¬ 
tion may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion, 
shall provide. These may be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right 
to be protected. 

And in Strauder v. W. Va. (100 U. S’, 303) this doctrine is affirmed, 
quoting Prigg v. Com. (16 Peters, 539) to the effect that ‘‘a right or 
an immunity, whether created by Congress or only guaranteed by it, 
even without any express delegation of power, may be protected by 
Congress.” 

After the passage of the judiciary act the assembly of Maryland 
under section 2 of an act approved December 27, 1791, ‘Relinquished 
to the Congress and Government of the United States full and abso¬ 
lute right and exclusive jurisdiction as well of soil as of persons re¬ 
siding or to reside thereon, pursuant to the eighth section of Article I 
of the Constitution.” 

That act reserved to the State control over the citizens to be affected 
thereby as to all their rights under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States until the formal acceptance of control over the soil by 
the Congress. 

Among those rights was that of suing in the United States circuit 
courts under.the provisions of the judiciary act. 

The act of cession committed the residents of that part of the State 
which came within the limits of the District of Columbia to the 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the Congress for the protection 
of all their rights in all cases whatsoever. 

At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States, under the provisions of which the judiciary act of September 
24, 1789, was passed, it was declared under section 2 of Article III 
that “the judicial power is extended to all cases in law and equity 
arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States * * * 
to controversies between the citizens of different States.” 


H. K. 13647 AND STATEMENT. 


7 

Tile population of the thirteen original States was bareh^ over 
3,000,000. 

The language for that particular provision was discussed at the 
time (see the reports of the Virginia convention, pp. 109-122-128) 
and it was supposed to be of very little importance, and this we can 
readily understand when we consider the limited amount and simple 
character of the business transactions at that time, in respect of 
which appeals to the United States courts were deemed likely to be 
made. 

But to-day, with over 80,000,000 population, thousands of cor¬ 
porations in every field of industry and commerce, involving vast 
millions of money values, increased in importance by the ties of 
interstate communication by railroad, telegraph, and telephone con¬ 
nections, bringing the rights of indivicluals and corporations through¬ 
out our vast territory into close business connections; with the 
marvelous expansion of Ihe control of Congress, and of the various 
Departments of the Government, over and in respect to every con¬ 
ceivable field of business and industry, affecting alike the whole 
people and the interests of the Government, it can be seen at once 
that here at the seat of government is centered a vast amount of 
business with which the citizens of the District must necessarily be 
connected; that citizens and corporations from the different States 
of the Union, through contracts with the residents of the District, 
whether in commercial matters connected with the Government or 
through the employment of professional services to be given here, 
must create many conditions * and occasions when legal rights, in 
cases of dispute and differences of opinion, must require appeals to 
the United States courts for satisfactory judicial determination. 

In view of the premises, we respectfully submit that we can fairly 
contend that there is under the Constitution and in the light of de¬ 
cided cases inherent power in Congress itself to so amend section 
629 of the United States Revised Statutes as to extend the jurisdic¬ 
tion of the United States circuit courts to the citizens of the District 
of Columbia in controversies with the citizens of the several States. 

And we pray such action as to your honorable bodies may be deemed 
wise and within your power. 

Nathaniel Wilson, 

T. P. B. Sand, 

Counsellors at law. 


O 


CONGRESS 


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